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INTRODUCTION

My dear compatriots, as I speak, terrorist attacks of
unprecedented proportions are underway in the Paris area.
There are dozens killed, there are many injured. It is a horror.1
Francois Holland, President of the French Republic on
November 14, 2015. The day of the Paris terrorist attacks, the
deadliest to occur in France since the end of World War II.

The terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen of 2015
brought anxiety and shock to Europe. Despite the social and
emotional consequences for the citizens of the European Union, the
political and legal consequences on the European legislative level
are occupying the Court of Justice of the European Union
(hereinafter “CJEU” or “the Court”) today.2 The terrorist attacks
lead to a tightening of the firearms legislation in the European
Union.3 Namely, Directive 2017/853, which governs the firearm
legislation in the European Union, is a direct far-reaching
implication and consequence of the terrorist attacks of 2015. This
Directive tightens the firearms regime in the European Union and
sets the common floor of firearms regulation for all Member States
of the European Union. This article discusses the implications of
this latest Directive on firearms possession in the European Union.
While in the United States, the right to bear arms is enshrined
in the US Constitution,4 the citizens of the Member States of the
European Union have no similar rights. The legislation of firearms
is a topic that is vastly differently treated in the United States and
in the European Union. Whereas in the European Union, the
societal and cultural history of firearms is characterized by
regulation and disarmament since the middle of the 20th century
1. François Hollande, President, Fr., French President Hollande’s Televised Address,
THOMSON REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shootinghollande-address-idUSKCN0T302N20151114 [https://perma.cc/8J6P-R7UG].
2. Case C-482/17, Czech v. Eur. Parl. & Council of the Eur. Union, 2019 E.C.R. I-1035.
3. The European Agenda on Security, at 17, COM (2015) 185 final (Apr. 28, 2015)
[hereinafter The European Agenda].
4. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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after two World Wars disrupted the continent,5 the United States
have a history of civil defense and the constitutional right to bear
arms.6 On both sides of the Atlantic, the topic of firearms legislation
inflames heated debate among firearms enthusiasts, pacifists, and
even legal scholars.
This Article will discuss the wider question of firearms
regulation by analyzing the firearms legislation of the European
Union. This article analyses the three consecutive Firearms
Directives, which have been enacted over time by the EU
legislature, the legal challenge of the Firearms Directive at the
CJEU, and the comparative perspective of firearms regulation in
the European Union and the United States. This article aims to take
an objective viewpoint and spare any emotionally heated policy
argument. The debate to which degree firearms legislation
influences crimes such as homicide, robbery or terrorist acts, shall
and cannot be discussed in the limited space of this article. Instead,
the focal point will be the legal debate about firearms regulation in
a federal system and the legislative competence exercised by the
federal lawmaker.
This article aims to give an overview of the legislation of
firearms in the European Union. The structure of the article is as
follows. In Part II, the three consecutive Firearms Directives of the
European Union shall be discussed on a historical and legal basis.7
Identifying the crucial aspects of the different legislative’s waves in
the area of firearms regulation. In Part III, the judicial proceedings
in front of the CJEU in case C-482/17 (Czech Republic v Parliament
and Council) shall be discussed, since it determined whether the
CJEU is willing to guide the EU on a continuous federal path in view
of a tightened regime on civilian firearms possession. In this
proceeding, the Czech Republic contended the newest version of
the Firearms Directive of the EU on the Union’s legislative
competence. In Part IV, a consideration of the Supreme Court of the
5. See generally ALEXIS HERACLIDES, SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE: THE HUMAN
DIMENSION, 1972 - 1992 (1993).
6. Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 22-23 (1984).
7. Council Directive 91/477/ EEC of 18 Jun. 1991 on Control of the Acquisition and
Possession of Weapons; Council Directive 2008/51/EC, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 21 May 2008 Amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC; Council Directive
2017/853, of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 17 2017 Amending
Council Directive 91/477/EEC.
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United States (hereinafter “SCOTUS” or “USSC”) Lopez decision in
light of the judicial proceedings at the CJEU shall be made. A
comparison between both cases can be highly fruitful to derive a
comparative understanding of the exercise of a federal competence
to regulate firearms. Specifically, to compare the stance, the
highest court of the respective legal system took in their respective
landmark judgments regarding the competence of the federal
lawmaker to regulate firearms.
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ON
FIREARMS REGULATION
The impetus of change has caught on in every sphere of
Community activity. There will be a single market for
everything from transport to energy to spin-off products from
scientific advances. The result, already percolating through,
will be a wider choice for consumers.8
Jaques Delors, President of the European Commission on
January 17, 1989, in an address given to the European
Parliament. Reiterating the new competence of the European
Communities in enacting legislation on interstate commerce.

The European Union derived its competence to deal with the
federal regulation of firearms via the establishment of the single
market in Europe. The single market was the most important and
ambitious project of the European Union with widest implications
for consumers and ramifications in nearly every policy area. The
United Kingdom’s European Commissioner Lord Arthur Cockfield
initiated the process to implement a single market in the EU. He
proposed, as Commissioner for Internal Market and Services under
Jaques Delors, a White Paper in 1985, identifying 300 measures to
be addressed in order to complete a single market.9 The White
Paper was well received by Jaques Delors and led to the adoption
of the Single European Act (hereinafter “the SEA”), a revolutionary
treaty revision that reformed the decision-making mechanisms of
the European Economic Community (hereinafter “the EEC”).10 In
8. Jaques Delors, President, Eur. Comm'n, Address Given by Jacques Delors to the
European Parliament (Jan. 17, 1989).
9. Comm’n of the Eur. Communities White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, at
15, COM (85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
10. JOSEPH WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE : DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR? 63 - 66 (1999).
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particular, the SEA established Article 100a, which gave the
European Union the competence to legislate in all kinds of policy
areas with the aim to provide a frictionless single market in
Europe.11 Eventually, one of these newly derived competences was
the competence to regulate firearms trade in the single market.
Federal firearms legislation in the European Union progressed
simultaneously with European integration, and it may well be
described as a consequence of European integration.
The history of European legislation of firearms starts with the
White Paper on the Single Market in 1985, in which a measure for
the approximation of firearms legislation was first mentioned by
the European Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”). The
following first Directive from 1991 on the approximation of laws
in the area of firearms legislation was mainly driven by the
implementation of the agenda of the SEA from 1986 and the
implementation of the Schengen Agreement from 1985.12 This
Directive falls into the phase of European Integration, in which the
European Union constituted an intergovernmental body called the
European Communities.13
The second step of harmonization in the area of firearms was
driven by the implementation of the UN Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms from 2001,14 which
resulted in the amending of the first Directive in 2008. At the time
of the second step of firearms harmonization, the European
Communities had become the European Community by the
Maastricht Treaty and subsequently had gained more
competences.15 The latest step in the harmonization of European
firearms legislation had its impetus in the terrorist attacks in Paris
and Copenhagen of 2015, which prompted the Commission to
bring forward a new legislative proposal, which resulted in the
11. Id. at 66 - 72.
12. Kristin Ashley Tessman, A Bright Day for the Black Market: Why Council Directive
2008/51/EC Will Lose the Battle Against Illicit Firearm Trade in the European Union, 38 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237, 247-48 (2009).
13. The Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the
European Communities art. 1, Apr. 8, 1965, 1967 O.J. (152) 2.
14. G.A. Res. 55/255, annex, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the
U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, at art. 2 (June 8, 2001).
15. Treaty on European Union, Council of the Eur. Communities & Comm'n of the Eur.
Communities, art. A-B, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
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most recent Directive of 2017. The final legislation in the area of
firearms was adopted under the framework of the Lisbon Treaty,16
which is the legal framework of the European Union as we know it
today. The Lisbon Treaty gives the European Union wide
competences to legislate in many policy areas.17 As described, the
harmonization of firearms legislation finds it raison d’être in the
single market of the EU and the area without border controls,
which the EU provides for its citizens (the Schengen Agreement).
We shall approach the existing legislation in a chronological order
to gain an overview of the existing framework.
A. Council Directive 91/477/EEC - The Promotion of Free Movement
and the Need to Ensure Internal Security
With the SEA of 1986, then the European Communities
committed itself to the establishment of a single market in
Europe.18 The SEA might be one of the most underestimated treaty
revisions of the European Union.19 With the shift towards majority
voting in the Council of the European Union (hereinafter “the
Council”) and the envisaged enactment of the single market by
1992,20 the SEA was the impetus for the European Union as it exists
today.21 Further, the accord on the Schengen Agreement in 1985,
from five of the ten Member States at that time, made it necessary
to establish a secure area within the common borders.22 This is
clearly formulated in Directive 91/477/EEC: “[t]he total abolition
of controls and formalities at intra-Community frontiers entails the
fulfillment of certain fundamental conditions.”23 Since there would
be no border controls between the Member States, it was vital to
ensure that the Member States adhere to the same minimum
16. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
17. See generally Jürgen Bast, New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform:
Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law, 49 COMMON MARKET L. REV. (2012).
18. Single European Act sec II, June 29, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
19. JOSEPH WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 65 (1999).
20. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities White Paper on Completing the Internal Market,
supra note 9, at 4.
21. Christina Eigel, Internal Security in an Open Market: The European Union
Addresses the Need for Community Gun Control, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 429, 430
(1995).
22. Tessman, supra note 12, at 248-49.
23. Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 7, Recital 3.
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standards of firearms regulation. “[T]he abolition of controls on
the safety of objects transported and on persons entails, among
other things, the approximation of weapon legislation.”24 The
single market and the envisaged borderless travel area (the
Schengen Agreement), therefore, made it necessary to find
common ground on a firearms regime in the European
Communities. In fact, “[a]rticles 77-90 of the Schengen Agreement
dealt specifically with the harmonization of national firearms and
ammunition legislation.”25 However, since the Schengen
Agreement was a treaty outside the European Communities, and
only later implemented under the umbrella of the European Union,
a mirroring legislation within the European Communities had to be
created.
1. The Way Leading to the First Directive on Firearms
Regulation in the European Union
Already in 1985, the Commission’s White Paper on the
completion of the single market by 1992 announced a proposal on
the harmonization of Member States’ firearms legislation.26
Interestingly, “[t]he purpose of the legislation was not to increase
the control of firearms, but rather to harmonize gun control
standards […].”27 Member States had different regimes that
governed firearms in their territory. However, the aim of the
Directive was essentially to provide minimum standards for the
acquisition and possession of firearms within the European
Communities.28 The single market and the Schengen Agreement
with its borderless travel possibilities for individuals also
increased the likelihood of firearm smuggling and trafficking by
criminals.29 Finally, the Commission drafted a proposal for the
Directive in 1987, within the process of establishing the internal
market. This proposal was accepted by the Council in 1991, after a
process of intensive discussion between Council, Commission, and
the European Parliament (hereinafter “the Parliament”). 30
24. Id.
25. Tessman, supra note 12, at 249.
26. Comm’n of the Eur. Communities White Paper on Completing the Internal Market,
supra note 9, at 15.
27. Eigel, supra note 21, at 431.
28. Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 7, art. 15(4).
29. Id.
30. Eigel, supra note 21, at 430-31.
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2. The Categorization of Firearms in the Directive
The Directive of 1992 establishes a categorization of firearms
in four categories (A) prohibited weapons; (B) weapons subject to
authorization; (C) weapons subject to declaration; and (D) other
weapons.31 All kinds of military firearms would fall under category
A, and are therefore prohibited.32 Firearms, such as semiautomatic firearms, would fall in category B, and are, therefore,
subject to authorization from the Member States authority.33
Firearms in category C, such as less dangerous firearms, must be
declared to the Member States authority.34 A lighthouse
achievement by the Directive was certainly the European Firearms
Certificate (today the European Firearms Pass), which functions as
a community-wide weapon pass and must be carried by the
weapon holder when traveling to another Member State.35
Directive 91/477/EEC explains: “[p]assing from one Member State
to another while in possession of a weapon should, in principle, be
prohibited ; whereas a derogation therefrom is acceptable only if a
procedure is adopted that enables Member States to be notified
that a firearm is to be brought into their territory.”36
3. The Legislative Process for Adopting the Directive
The procedure for adopting the Directive was characterized
by consensus building in the Council. “The United Kingdom, […]
was greatly concerned about the ability of sportsmen to carry guns
freely across internal borders without prior permission.”37 This
issue could be solved with the European Firearms Certificate.
Having said that, the Parliament in its role as an advisory body at
that time was involved in the process. “The parliament approved
the amended proposal, but also sought to clarify and tighten the
requirements.”38 However, not all recommendations of the
Parliament had been adopted by the Commission.39 The Council of
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 7, annex I.
Id.
Eigel, supra note 21, at 434.
Id. at 435 - 36.
Id. at 435.
Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 7, at Recital 6.
Eigel, supra note 21, at 434.
Id. at 436.
Id.
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the European Communities adopted the Directive, after
consultation of the Parliament, on June 18, 1991.40 “The Member
States had until January 1, 1993, to pass all legislation and
regulations necessary to implement the Directive.”41 Despite minor
national modifications and adjustments, the regimes of the already
participating Member States were in compliance with the
Directive.42 Only Finland and the Czech Republic, when they
respectively joined the European Union in 1995 and 2004 had to
substantially redraft new firearms legislation to comply with the
EU standard.43 “Finland, in contrast, did not pass any legislation
regulating firearms until 1998 – only after Directive 91/477/EEC
took effect. Finland established only the minimum requirements
for compliance with the EU Directive on harmonization.”44
The legal basis for the Directive was Article 100 A of the EEC
Treaty, which allowed for the approximation of laws, which are
necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal
market.45 This article, an achievement of the SEA, can be compared
to the Commerce Clause in the United States federal legal system
since it provides the legislature with a wide competence to adopt
federal laws regulation all kinds of interstate commerce. In the EU
legal system, interstate commerce is built upon the principle of
mutual recognition.46 The Member States would recognize other
Member States’ standards on certain categories of goods and,
therefore, provide frictionless full access to their markets.47
Notably, the Directive already includes and envisages the idea of
“[m]utual confidence in the field of protection of the safety of
persons which these rules will generate between Member States
[…].”48 This is the concept that was further revisited and embraced

40. Id. at 437.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. HE 183/1997 Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle ampuma-aselaiksi ja laiksi
poliisilain 23 §:n sekä laiksi poliisin henkilörekistereistä annetun lain 19 ja 20 §:n
muuttamisesta (Finnish Parliament ed., 1997); Act No. 119/2002 Coll., on Firearms and
Ammunition § 119/2002 (Parliament of the Czech. ed., 2002).
44. Tessman, supra note 12, at 247.
45. Single European Act, supra note 18, art. 100a.
46. See generally CHRISTINE JANSSENS, THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN EU LAW
(2013).
47. Id. Part I.
48. Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 7, at Recital 5.
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by the CJEU in the concept of mutual trust between the Member
States.49
4. The Wider Implications of the Directive
There were direct impacts and consequences by this first
Directive on firearms trade and possession in the European Union.
Scientific studies yield that already the harmonization by Directive
91/477/EEC leads to a significant decrease of firearm suicide and
homicide in the particular Member States like Austria.50 Finally, it
is important to notice that the creation of the single market and the
Schengen Agreement required a common security standard within
the borders. Therefore, a common minimum standard on the
acquisition and possession of firearms had to be established,
which, in turn, would create mutual confidence between the
Member States. As Tessman writes, “[t]he 1991 Directive, […],
embodied a compromise between Member State concerns arising
from the abolition of internal-frontiers controls and the need to
control the acquisition and possession of firearms among the
Member States.”51 In this sense, the Directive established a
common floor for firearms legislation in the European Union,
which the Member States were required to implement and to abide
by.
B.

Council Directive 2008/51/EC – Tackling Illicit Firearms Trade
in the European Community

The next major achievement in the process of a unified
firearms legislation in the European Union was Directive
2008/51/EC, which amended Directive 91/477/EEC.52 This
Directive falls into a different phase of European integration. The
European Communities had become the European Community
49. See generally Koen Lenaerts, La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual
(Yet Not Blind) Trust, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 805 (2017).
50. Nestor D. Kapusta et al., Firearm Legislation Reform in the European Union: Impact
on Firearm Availability, Firearm Suicide and Homicide Rates in Austria, 191 BRITISH J.
PSYCHIATRY 253, 257 (2007).
51. Tessman, supra note 12, at 252.
52. Parliament & Council, Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and
possession of weapons § 2008/51/EC (European Union ed., Official Journal of the
European Union 2008).
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with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.53 The Maastricht
Treaty reformed and amended the Treaties establishing the
European Communities.54 It renamed the European Economic
Community to European Community to reflect its expanded
competences beyond economic matters.55 The Maastricht Treaty
provided the European Community with more competences in
fields such as citizenship law or external relations with third
states.56 It established the European Community as a hybrid
international actor, reflecting a number of tensions built into the
roots of the Treaty.57 One consequence was that the Commission
was able to sign treaties of the United Nations as a regional
economic integration organization.58 The Commission exercised
this new competence by – inter alia - signing the United Nations
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts, Components and Ammunition.59 With the
accession to the UN Protocol, the European Community had to
amend the Directive 91/477/EEC to comply with the content of the
protocol.60
1. The Way Leading to the Directive
The impetus for this intra-EU reform on firearms legislation
came from the outside, as “[t]he United Nations adopted a
resolution in 2001 establishing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (Organized Crime
Convention).”61 Consequently, “[t]he UN General Assembly
adopted a resolution, […], to supplement this Convention with the
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
53. Treaty on European Union, supra note 15, at art. A.
54. See generally Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the
Maastricht Agreement, 42 INT'L COMP. L. Q. (1993).
55. Id.
56. Treaty on European Union, supra note 15, at art. 20(1); see generally Michael
Smith, Still Rooted in Maastricht: EU External Relations as a ‘Third-Generation Hybrid’, 34 J.
EUR. INTEGRATION 699 (2012).
57. Smith, supra note 56, at 699.
58. See, e.g., CHARLOTTE BRETHERTON & JOHN VOGLER, THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL
ACTOR (2d ed. 2005).
59. G.A. Res. 55/255, supra note 12, art. 1.
60. Directive 2008/51, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008
Amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on Control of the Acquisition and Possession of
Weapons, Recital 3 § 2008/51/EC, 2008/51/EC, O.J. (L 179) 5.
61. Tessman, supra note 12, at 250.
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Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UN
Protocol).”62 In January 2002, the Commission on behalf of the
European Community signed the Protocol. The Commission
inferred the competence to sign the Protocol from its internal
market competence, by the implied external powers doctrine
developed by the CJEU.63 Following the European Communities
declaration: “[t]he Protocol […] shall apply, with regard to the
competences transferred to the Union, to the territories in which
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is applied and
under the conditions laid down in that Treaty.”64 Since the
Directive 91/477/EEC did not fulfill all requirements of the UN
Protocol, the Commission proposed an amendment to the
Directive. A proposal to amend Directive 91/477/EEC was drafted
by the Commission in 2006.65 Interestingly, Member States with
huge arm exporting corporations in the EU, such as Germany and
the United Kingdom, have not ratified the UN Protocol until
today,66 however, they are bound by the EU Directive, which
implements the UN Protocol.
2. The Substantive Changes of the Directive
The improved functioning of the European Firearms Pass and
the enhanced exchange of information between the Member States
are the two major objectives of the new Directive from an intra-EU
perspective. As acknowledged in Directive 2008/51/EC, the
European Firearms Pass “functions in a satisfactory way.”67
However, there was room for improvement in terms of hunters
and marksmen, as the Commission pointed out.68 The Directive
further points to the enhanced exchange of information between
Member States to combat illicit trafficking and manufacturing of
62. Id.
63. See generally Smith, supra note 56.
64. Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their
Parts and Components and Ammunition, July 11, 2001, 2326 U.N.T.S. 208 [hereinafter
Protocol Against Illicit Manufacturing].
65. Tessman, supra note 12, at 250.
66. Protocol Against Illicit Manufacturing, supra note 64.
67. Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2008, supra note 7, Recital 14.
68. European Commission, Evaluation of Council Directive 91/477/EC of 18 June
1991, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC of 21 May 2008, on Control of the Acquisition
and Possession of Weapons at 18, COM (2015) 751 final.
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firearms, which is envisaged under the new Directive.69 From the
external perspective, the new Directive had to comply with the
newly signed UN Protocol. The Directive further provides that
“[t]he accession of the Community to the Protocol requires
amendments to certain provisions of Directive 91/477/EEC.”70
The Protocol’s main objective is the decrease of the illicit
manufacturing and trafficking of arms.71 Therefore, “[t]he 2008
amendments expand the scope of Directive 91/477/EEC, now
addressing such issues as illicit manufacturing and trafficking.”72
First, the Directive 2008/51/EC now also includes the notion
of convertible firearms, which had been a prevalent concern for
national police authorities. The Directive states in this regard,
“[p]olice intelligence evidence shows an increase in the use of
converted weapons within the Community. It is therefore essential
to ensure that such convertible weapons are brought within the
definition of a firearm […].”73 This measure transposes the
requirements from the UN Protocol into Community law.
Moreover, it “[p]rovides for a more comprehensive regulatory
response to illicit manufacturing, as converted weapons are easily
‘re-manufactured’ from readily available firearm component
parts.”74 Second, the Directive also calls for the marking of firearms
directly after manufacturing. The Directive further clarifies, “[t]he
Protocol establishes an obligation to mark weapons at the time of
manufacture […].”75 By this measure, the Directive aims to get a
grip on the illicit manufacturing of firearms. “If a firearm is not
marked, the Member State must ensure that the firearm is
deactivated.”76 In the area of enhanced cooperation, the Directive
called for a computerized data-filling system to which authorized
authorities are granted access and the setting up of a contact group

69. Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2008, supra note 7, Recital 15.
70. Id. Recital 3.
71. Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, supra
note, 14.
72. Tessman, supra note 12, at 255.
73. Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2008, supra note 7, Recital 4.
74. Tessman, supra note 12, at 256.
75. Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2008, supra note 7, Recital 7.
76. Tessman, supra note 12, at 256-57.
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for the exchange of information among the Member States.77
Finally, the Directive brought new minimum requirements in
relation to entities involved in firearm sales of transfer and
persons who are eligible to acquire a firearm.78 The legal basis for
the Directive did not change, as the Commission still used the
approximation of laws Article, at that time the re-named Article 95
of the TEC Treaty.79
3. The Wider Ramifications of the Directive
The new Directive brought major changes and a tightening of
firearms regulation in the European Community. Visibly, the
minimum requirements of firearm legislation in the Community
had been heightened. Therefore, the process of adopting the
Directive in the Council was marked by intensive discussions
between the Member States. “Austria and Finland abstained from
voting in the Council during the adoption of the Firearms Directive
2008/51/EC, as it tightened the gun control law and imposed the
introduction of a national register of firearms.”80 Especially for
Austria, which has many firearm holders, the implementation of
Directive 2008/51/EC proved to be an administrative and legal
challenge.81 Due to the co-decision procedure adopted pursuant to
the Maastricht Treaty, the Directive had to be also adopted by the
Parliament. Remarkably, some members of the Parliament wanted
to push further in the regulation of illicit firearms.82 However,
opposition in the Council and in the Parliament stopped this
process, and the Directive was adopted with minor amendments in
the first reading in the Parliament.83
The success or failure of the amended Directive, in light of the
market for illicit firearms, is strongly debated. Scholars argue that
the Directive was a failure with regard to illicit firearms trafficking,
since the European Community lacked the competences to
77. Id. at 261.
78. Id. at 247.
79. Treaty of Nice, Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 95, Oct. 3, 2001,
2001 O.J. (C80) 1.
80. Brigitte Pircher, Member States’ Opposition in the Council of the European Union
and its Impacts on the Implementation of Directives, 46 OZP 1, 5 (2017).
81. Id.
82. Tessman, supra note 10, at 259.
83. Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM C6-0081/2006) (2006).
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efficiently tackle the issue of illicit firearms trade.84 As Tessman
writes, “[t]he complex political nature of the European Union [at
that time] may render a single, effective legislative response
unattainable.”85 In conclusion, the Directive significantly
heightened the floor of firearms legislation in the European Union.
Thus, bringing the firearms legislation in the European Union
towards a more unified standard, and therefore, enhancing the
intra-EU trade of firearms.
C. Council Directive 2017/853 – The European Agenda on
Security in the Aftermath of the Paris and Copenhagen Terrorist
Attacks
The last legislative act in the area of firearms legislation by the
European Union is Council Directive 2017/853, which amended
the two previous Directives. The most crucial aspect of the
Directive, preventing and fighting terrorist attacks in the EU, is
directly visible at the beginning of the Directive. “Certain aspects
of Directive 97/477/EEC need to be further improved in a
proportionate way, in order to address the misuse of firearms for
criminal purposes, and considering recent terrorist acts.”86 In
contrast to its two predecessors, Directive 2017/853 was
prompted by terrorist acts in the Member States, namely in Paris
and Copenhagen. 87 Both attacks had been carried out, respectively,
by illicitly reactivated firearms and illicitly acquired firearms.88
The Communication by the Commission on ‘The European Agenda
84. Tessman, supra note 12, at 238.
85. Id. at 264.
86. Directive 2017/853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May
2017 and Amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on Control of the Acquisition and
Possession of Weapons, Recital 2, 2017 O.J. (L 137/22) (EC) [hereinafter Amending
Directive].
87. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, supra note 3, at 17.
88. Jason Burke, Military Grade Firearms Increasingly Available to Terrorists in Europe
Report,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
18,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/18/arms-race-criminal-gangs-helpingterrorists-get-weapons-report-warns [perma.cc/5ZTF-UEHB]; Peter Krogh Andersen,
Terrorangreb i København: Gerningsvåben stammer fra et hjemmerøveri, DR (Feb. 8, 2015),
https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/terrorangreb-i-koebenhavn-gerningsvaabenstammer-fra-et-hjemmeroeveri [perma.cc/K24M-873V]; Policy-makers and citizens
criticize the proposed revision of the European Firearms Directive, EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF
ASSOCIATIONS FOR HUNTING & CONSERVATION (2016) [hereinafter FACE]
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on Security’ points out, “[r]ecent terrorist attacks have focused
attention on how organized criminals are able to access and trade
firearms in Europe, even military grade firearms, in large
numbers.”89 The new Directive falls into the latest legal framework
of European integration, the Lisbon Treaty, which created the
European Union as it is known today since 2009.90 The Lisbon
Treaty, as a highly ambitious treaty, gives the EU wide
competences in many policy areas and enhances the power of the
federal lawmaker.
1. The Way Leading to the Directive
The Commission acknowledged weaknesses in the two earlier
Directives in the REFIT Report from 2015.91 In its report, the
Commission lamented the absence of disaggregated data on
firearms circulating in the European Union, as well as the lack of
comparable data on trends in criminal acts involving firearms in
the European Union.92 The REFIT report also underlined that the
implementing process by the Member States has demonstrated
several inconsistencies and also revealed its very limited impact to
counter illicit firearms trafficking in the European Union.93 This
corresponds to Member States’ experiences, which have shown
that the implementation of the Directives concerning firearm
minimum standards has proven to be an obstacle in certain
Member States, which have a high number of firearms fluctuating
in the society.94 The implementation of the measures, as well as the
immediate threat of terrorist acts committed with illicit firearms,
prompted the Commission to draft a new legislative intervention
in the area of firearms legislation.95

89. The European Agenda, supra note 3, at 17.
90. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 16, art. 6.
91. TECHNOPOLIS ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION EVALUATION OF THE FIREARMS DIRECTIVE FINAL REPORT (European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry ed.,
Dec. 2014).
92. Christian Ponti, An Appraisal of the European Union Legal Framework on Illicit
Firearms Trafficking after Directive 2017/853/EU, 4 RIVISTA DI STUDI E RICHERCHE SULLA
CRIMINALITÁ ORGANIZZATA 13, 20-21 (2018).
93. Id. at 21.
94. Pircher, supra note 80, at 5.
95. Ponti, supra note 92, at 22.
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2. The Substantive Changes of the Directive
With the two aforementioned objectives, this ambitious
Directive has a strong focus on security.96 Nevertheless, the legal
basis for the Directive remained Article 114 of the TFEU, the
renamed Article 95. With the aim of providing the means for the
approximation of laws to achieve the objectives of the single
market.97 The strong security focus of the Directive, drafted on the
legal basis of achieving a frictionless market, might raise concerns
on whether the wide scope of the Directive is overzealous. That
being said, the Directive explains, “[i]n accordance with the
principle of proportionality, […], this Directive does not go beyond
what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.”98 Further,
the respect for the principle of subsidiarity, which is a fundamental
principle of EU lawmaking, is acknowledged in the same
paragraph, pointing out that “[t]he objectives of this Directive
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, […].”99 With
this hedging against possible accusations of not respecting the
principles of lawmaking in the European Union, the Commission
wisely took into account possible confrontational caveats by
critical Member States.
In terms of its content, the Directive moves the ‘most
dangerous’ semi-automatic firearms from category B (firearms
subject to authorization) to category A. These firearms will not be
allowed to be held by private persons, even if they have been
permanently deactivated.100 Further, the Directive “[a]ims […] to
better harmonize Member States’ legislation on the marking of
firearms which, […], was lacking in uniformity and facilitated
criminals in illegally trading weapons parts or illicitly reactivating
firearms.”101 An even more important point in this tightened
approach is the possibility of the Commission to adopt
implementing acts, which are binding on the Member States and
self-executive.102 By this measure, the Commission aims to achieve
96. Id. at 22-23.
97. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 16, art. 114. at 94-95.
98. Amending Directive, supra note 86, at Recital 33.
99. Id.
100. Ponti, supra note 92, at 24.
101. Id.
102. Jürgen Bast, New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of
Parliamentarization in EU Law, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 885, 908 (2012).
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a true common standard in the field of marking of firearms, since
implementation in the Member States has proven difficult.
Whereas before certain standards of marking of firearms in the
different Member States deviated, the new Directive aims to
harmonize even at the lower levels of Member States’
administration.103 This shift of competences is clearly
acknowledged in the new Directive.104
Another point of concern was the reactivation of firearms
since this technique has been used to acquire firearms for the
terrorist attacks in Paris.105 The Commission addressed that point
in the new Firearms Directive.106 Consequently, Directive
2017/853 sets out a very comprehensive regulation of converted
firearms. “National registers must keep records of deactivated
firearms and their owners.”107 Deactivated firearms are now
within the scope of the Firearms Directive, as they must be
classified as category C firearms (firearms and weapons subject to
declaration).108 Further, “[t]he European Commission has
prepared a proposal package that sets out rigorous and
harmonized standards criteria how Member States shall include in
their National Firearms Acts the deactivation criteria for firearms
to become unfit for use as a firearms.”109 This was a small
legislative step but attached with high administrative cost for the
Member States since deactivated, and even acoustic firearms have
to be accurately tracked under the new Directive.110

103. Parliament and Council Regulation 182/2011 of Feb. 16 2011, Laying Down the
Rules and General Principles Concerning Mechanisms for Control by Member States of the
Commission’s Exercise of Implementing Powers 2011 O.J.( L 55) 13.
104. “In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive,
implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission.” Amending Directive, supra
note 86, Recital 30.
105. Burke, supra note 88.
106. “The European Commission’s package of measure to tighten firearms control
also includes an implementing regulation laying down common minimum standards for
the deactivation of firearms, which make re-activation much more difficult in case of
deactivated firearms.” Csaba Szabó, Examination of the Need for a Directive to Strengthen
the Control Over Possession of Firearms Envisaged by the European Commission in the
Context of New Types of Security Challenges Affecting the European Union, 13 HADMÉRNÖK 3,
486, 492 (2018).
107. Ponti, supra note 92, at 28.
108. Amending Directive, supra note 86, at 37.
109. Szabó, supra note 106, at 492.
110. Amending Directive, supra note 86, at 37-8.
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3. The Legislative Backdrop of the Directive
From the start, the Directive was under critics by many
stakeholders. From a policy-making point of view, strong
criticisms have been raised with regard to lacking impact
assessment before drafting the proposal of the new Directive.111
Instead, the EU lawmaker took into account the REFIT report. The
report was not specifically intended as assessment in light of a new
legislative reform but rather as a general audit of the impact of the
Directive.112 Further, critics in the Parliament focused on the
subsidiarity principle of the EU, which is enshrined in Article 5(3)
of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter “TEU”).113 “[M]EPs
rejected the Commission’s proposal recalling the subsidiarity
principle, which enables Member States to adopt legislation
tailored to national requirements.”114 While the precedent
Directives on firearms legislation faced critics by stakeholders,
Council Directive 2017/853 was under immense criticism from
many sides.115
During the legislative process of adopting the Directive, many
members of national parliaments and of the EU Parliament were
under pressure from lobbying organizations. This has been
highlighted especially in the Czech Republic, in which arms
producers opposed the Directive.116 Social science “[r]esearch
showed that opinions are shared among the members of
parliament, the government and interest groups regarding the
implementation of this Directive in Czech legislation, […].”117 Czech
firearm producers had a lot at stake with the implementation of the
Directive. Namely, Czech firearms producers such as Česká
zbrojovka or Sellier & Bellot are likely to be affected by the
tightened approach towards firearm possession and

111. See FACE, supra note 88.
112. Parliament & Council, Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and
possession of weapons see Article 17. 2008.
113. See FACE, supra note 88.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Katerina Bočková et al., Lobbying Activities in Relation to the Implementation of
EU Directive 91/477/EEC on Control and Acquisition of Weapons, 6 FORUM SCIENTIAE
OECONOMIA 91, 98 (2018).
117. Id. at 91.
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manufacturing.118 Therefore, they opposed the Directive via
industry associations, a process widely popular in EU
lawmaking.119 Nevertheless, the Directive was accepted by the
Parliament on March 14, 2017, and adopted in the Council on April
25, 2017, against the rejections from the Czech Republic, Poland,
and Luxembourg.120 Interestingly, Poland and the Czech Republic
regarded the Directive as too strict in its legislative approach
towards firearms, whereas Luxembourg rejected the Directive as
it considered as too weak to efficiently tackle the possession of
illicit firearms.121
4. The Litigation Consequences of the Directive
In 2017, after the Directive was adopted in the Council, the
Czech Republic—as being an outvoted Member State—decided to
bring a case in front of the CJEU, claiming the invalidity of the
relevant Directive. “[t]he Government of the Czech Republic
instructed the Minister of the Interior to submit an analysis of the
legislative impact of Directive 91/477/EEC to the Government […].
This analysis was also prepared taking into account the
proceedings of the Czech action at the Court of Justice of the
European Union regarding the invalidity of this Directive.”122 The
critic was shared by Poland, which rejected the Directive alongside
the Czech Republic in the Council.123 Pursuant to Poland, “[t]he
new solutions are excessive, too harsh and not always rational.”124
Subsequently, Poland intervened on the side of the Czech Republic
at the CJEU. Notably, the current Polish government is at the same

118. Sellier & Bellot (Company profile), European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofund)(2020).
119. Bočková, et al., supra note 116, at 98.
120. Press Release, Ministry of the Interior and Administration of The Republic of
Poland, A Reponse to a Multiple Petition Regarding a Case by Republic of Poland to European
Tribunal of Justice Against European Parliament Directive 91/477/EEC On the Control of the
Acquisition and Possession of Weapons (Oct. 6, 2017).
121. Aline Robert, EU States Reach Difficult Compromise on Firearms, EURACTIV
FRANCE (Dec. 21, 2016) https://www.euractiv.com/section/security/news/eu-statesreach-difficult-compromise-on-firearms/ [https://perma.cc/NAQ2-Y7ZB].
122. Bočková, et al., supra note 116, at 99.
123. Press Release, supra note 120.
124. Id.
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time in an ongoing judicial battle with the European Union
regarding its overhaul of the national judiciary.125
D.

Conclusion

European harmonization in the field of firearms legislation
has come from a minimum-standard approach, given the initial
implementation of the single market, to a restrictive standard,
comprehensively covering all kinds of “portable barreled weapons
that expel projectiles by the action of a combustible propellant.”126
The history of harmonization in the field of firearms in the
European Union is a history that finds many precedents in other
policy fields, such as the regulation of tobacco or consumer
products. The Union is inevitably on its way to “lay the foundations
of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.”127 This evercloser union requires harmonization of legislation in various fields.
Among them, the alignment of firearms regulation in the Member
States. The legislative history of the regulation of firearms has to
be seen through the lens of the expanding of competences of the
Union via the subsequent treaty revisions. Therefore, the history of
progression in firearms regulation is a history of European
integration.
As of today, some scholars argue for an even tighter approach
to firearms legislation, given the shortcomings of the current
legislation and future security threats.128 Ponti notes, that
“[n]otwithstanding this undeniable process, the EU still lacks a
legislative policy to fight all aspects of IFT [Illicit Firearms
Trafficking] comprehensively. In particular, it would be desirable
to introduce further legislative intervention with the purpose of
effectively harmonizing Member States’ substantive criminal law

125. Niels Kirst, The Independence of Judges in Polish’s Courts: the CJEU Judgement in
Commission v Poland (C-192/18), DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY BREXIT INSTITUTE (Nov. 19, 2019),
http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2019/11/the-independence-of-judges-in-polishs-courtsthe-cjeu-judgement-in-commission-v-poland-c-192-18/ [perma.cc/ZB2H-T9LX].
126. Parliament & Council, Directive 2017/853 of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and
possession of weapons see Article 1. 2017.
127. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Preamble, 2010 O.J. C
83/01, at 16.
128. Doris Kiendl, Security Issues in the European Union in the Light of Current
Developments (A. V. Akulshina ed., Scientific Advisor 2019).
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on IFT (common definitions on offences and penalties), […].”129
Other scholars point to the risk of harming other Union objectives
by over-harmonizing in the field of firearms regulation. “It should
be noted that the regulation may adversely affect the conditions of
competition both within the internal market and the international
market in a number of professional and economic fields closely
linked to the legal possession of firearms (pushing back the online
trade; weapons-related cultural heritage; historical weapon
collection; research in connection with firearms; paid hunting).”130
In conclusion, there is no prevailing opinion on the future of
firearms legislation in the European Union, while the majority
agree with the aims already achieved by the three consecutive
Directives, and some minority voices criticize an overharmonization.
The following Part III of this Article analyses the CJEU’s
judgement in Czech Republic v Parliament and Council (C-482/17).
Beforehand, as a measure to enhance the overview of the previous
firearms legislation in the European Union and to highlight the
differences between the three consecutive Directives, the
following table is proposed:

129. Ponti, supra note 92, at 31.
130. Szabó, supra note 106, at 493.
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Table 1: Schematic overview of the different aspects of the
three consecutive Directives on firearms regulation in the
European Union
Stage of
European
Integration

Main reason for
the legislative
amendment

Legal basis
for the
Directive

Procedure of
adopting the
Directive

Main
objective of
the Directive

Directive
91/477/
EEC

European
Communities

Establishment of
the Single Market
and the Schengen
Agreement

Article 100 A
TEC
(Internal
Market
competence)

Cooperation
procedure
(opinion
by the European
Parliament)

Mutual
confidence in
security
among the
Member States

Directive
2008/51/E
C

European
Community

Signing of the UN
Protocol

Article 95
(1) EC
Treaty
(Internal
Market
competence)

Co-decision
procedure (vote
in the European
Parliament)

Directive
2017/853

European
Union

Terrorist attacks
in Paris and
Copenhagen

Article 114
TFEU
(Internal
Market
competence)

Ordinary
legislative
procedure (vote
in the European
Parliament)

Implementing
the UN
Protocol
against the
Illicit
Manufacturing
of and
Trafficking in
Firearms
Tighten the
grip on illicit
firearms
ownership in
the European
Union

III. DISCUSSION ON CZECH REPUBLIC V PARLIAMENT AND
COUNCIL – CHALLENGE OF THE FIREARMS DIRECTIVE AT THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
First (an obvious point): firearms are intrinsically dangerous
goods. They give rise to safety concerns not only for their users
but for the wider public. That is why the legislature has
introduced […] provisions that restrict the possession and
acquisition of such weapons.131
Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion in Czech Republic
v Parliament and Council. Rebutting the argument of the Czech
Republic that the European Union may only regulate in the
internal market regarding the safety of the user of products.

131. See Case C-482/17, supra note 2.

2020]

FIREARMS REGULATION IN THE EU

879

After having described the history of firearms legislation on
the European level, Part III of the article provides an overview of
the Case Czech Republic v Parliament and Council (C-482/17). In
this case, the Czech Republic contested the legal basis of the latest
version of the Firearms Directive. The question, which the CJEU
quintessentially had to answer was if Article 114 TFEU provides
for the competence to enact security legislation of the EU.
A.

Background of the Case

On December 3, 2019, the CJEU gave its final verdict on the socalled Czech firearms case.132 In this judgment, which gives
guidance on the lawmaking in the European Union, the CJEU
touched on many principles of EU law and refined their meaning.
The European legislature used its mandate for the single market to
amend the previous Firearms Directive 2008/51/EC133 and
Council Directive 91/477/EEC,134 in the aftermath of terrorist
attacks in Paris135 and Copenhagen.136 The initial proposal of the
Commission gained steam under the Dutch presidency of the
Council in 2016. Finally, the Directive underwent the Trialogue
process before being approved according to the co-decision
procedure by the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament
approved the amended Directive on March 14, 2017, while the
Council followed suit on April 25, 2017, with only the Czech
Republic, Poland and Luxembourg disagreeing. While Poland
voted against the Directive, due to stringent norms, Luxembourg
voted against the Directive since it wanted a stronger regulation of
firearms.137 Critical voices on political participation and
accountability accompanied the legislative process of the
Directive.138
There is a specific prehistory to the case. After the terrorist
attacks in Paris and Copenhagen, the Juncker Commission decided
to tighten the gun laws in the European Union.139 This was met by
132. Id. art. 5.
133. Directive 2008/51/EC, supra note 7.
134. See Council Directive 91/477/EEC, supra note 7.
135. See Hollande, supra note 1.
136. See Andersen, supra note 88.
137. Robert, supra note 121.
138. See FACE, supra note 88.
139. DG HOME, Agreement on Commission Proposal to Increase Citizens’ Security
(Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs) (Dec. 21, 2016).
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much skepticism on the Czech side.140 The Czech Republic’s gun
laws differed tremendously from those of most other Member
States of the European Union. The history of liberal gun possession
in the Czech Republic stretches back to the 18th century.141
Further, the Czech Republic had a flourishing armament
industry.142 The Czech Republic had specifically harsh aversion
towards the Directive since civilian firearm ownership has a long
tradition in the Czech Republic,143 and the Czech government, as
well as Czech civil society groups, feared severe consequences for
the Czech economy and the Czech cultural heritage.144 Therefore,
the Czech Republic had a great interest to oppose the Directive,
supported by the fact that the Czech Republic is the seventh-largest
post-war arm exporter in the world.145
After being outvoted in Parliament and Council, the Czech
Government decided to challenge the Directive at the CJEU.146 The
Czech Republic alleged a breach of the principle of conferral of
powers (Article 5(2) TEU), of the principle of proportionality
(Article 5(4) TEU), of the principle of legal certainty and protection
of legitimate expectations and finally, of the principle of nondiscrimination.147 The Czech Republic, supported by Poland and
Hungary in its claim, fired full blast to protect its political interest
in front of the CJEU.148 The case is interesting for three reasons.
First, the case deals with the question of legal basis under Article
114 TFEU and has therefore gained significant attention from EU
lawyers. Second, it is yet another case in which the Czech Republic
140. Euractive, EU Gun Control Push Undermines Trust in EU, Czech Minister Claims,
EURACTIVE (Aug. 10, 2017) https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/eu-guncontrol-push-undermines-trust-in-eu-czech-minister-claims/ [https://perma.cc/5YYV7DZA].
141. David W. Cerny, Jan Lopaka, and Gabriela Baczynska, Gun Culture in the Czech
Republic, REUTERS (June 9, 2016), https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/gun-culture-inthe-czech-republic [https://perma.cc/PT5A-RRHK] .
142. Martin Hrobsky, The Defense Industry in the Czech Republic, CZECH RADIO (Nov.
28, 2002), https://www.radio.cz/en/section/economic/the-defense-industry-in-the-czechrepublic [https://perma.cc/5QLR-AGTG].
143. Cerny, supra note 142.
144. Euractive 2017, supra note 140.
145. Martin Armstrong, The World’s Biggest Postwar Arms Exporters, STATISTA
(2018)
https://www.statista.com/chart/13205/the-worlds-biggest-postwar-arms-exporters/
[https://perma.cc/6SXT-WEPE].
146. Euractive 2017, supra note 140. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, para. 2.
147. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, para. 20.
148. Id., para. 16.
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is acting jointly with Hungary and the Republic of Poland (which
intervened to support the Czech Republic) to defend their common
interest.149 Opposingly, France and the Commission intervened to
support the Council and the Parliament. Third, Directive
2017/853, which was contested by the Czech Republic, amended
Directive 91/477, which was the first legislative measure setting a
minimum standard regarding civilian firearms acquisition and
possession in the European Union.
On April 11, 2019, AG Sharpston opined that the claims by the
Czech Republic are unsubstantial and that the CJEU should uphold
the Directive as it stands.150 The most important precedents for
this case were the respective claims on the legal basis against the
tobacco Directives from tobacco manufactures (see British
American Tobacco151 and Philip Morris Brands152). The trade, sale,
and possession of tobacco in the single market is situated in a field
between health protection and commerce, whereas, the sale, trade,
and possession of firearms are situated in a field between security
and commerce. The critical question the CJEU had to answer was,
if Article 114 TFEU is an appropriate legal basis for measures
which in large parts tighten security standards of firearm
possession, or if this impinges of the national sovereignty of the
Member States to regulate firearms.
B. More Unity in Gun Ownership Requirements? The CJEU’s
Decision on the Legality of the Revised European Firearms Directive
in C-482/17153
1. First Plea: Breach of the Principle of Conferral of Powers
In its first plea, the Czech Republic alleged a breach of the
principle of conferral of powers by the European legislature. The
149. See,
e.g.,
Case
C-715/17,
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=219670&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2197421
[https://perma.cc/QY45-6ZAQ].
150. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2.
151. Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health, ex parte British American
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. & Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-11453.
152. Case C – 547/14, Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. v. Sec'y of State for Health,
2016.
153. Parts of the following analysis derive from an earlier analysis of the case
published here, Niels Kirst, Conferred Powers, Proportionality and Non-discrimination in the
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baseline of this argument was that the aims of the new Directive
diverted significantly from the aims of the earlier Directives on
Firearms of 2008 and 2017. Therefore, Article 114 TFEU ceased to
constitute an appropriate legal basis. The Czech Republic
submitted that an amended Directive should not lead to new
objectives which derogate from the original legal basis.154 By
implementing the fight against terrorism within the new Directive,
the European legislature infringed on this principle and thus could
not base its competence on the internal market pursuant to Article
114 TFEU.
The CJEU, first, generally discussed the appropriate legal basis
for adopting a Directive or a Regulation.155 Highlighting that new
legislation might have several purposes. However, the
predominant purpose determines the appropriate legal basis of
the new legislation. Second, the CJEU broached on the adequate use
of Article 114 TFEU,156 by assessing that the fight against
international terrorism is an objective of general interest for the
European Union (in analogy health was identified as general
interest in British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco).157
Subsequently, the CJEU had to decide, if the safety and prevention
of terrorist attacks had become the predominant purpose of the
amended Directive and, if therefore, the legal basis of Article 114
TFEU ceased to apply.
The Czech Republic argued that the 2017 Directive should be
analyzed in isolation from the two earlier acts. In contrary,
Parliament and Council argued that the amended Directive has to
be analyzed in light of the two earlier Directives.158 The CJEU stated
that an amended Directive must always be assessed in light of its
earlier versions. Therefore, Directive 91/477 and the amendments
by the new Directive serve as benchmark regarding the adequate
legal basis. By discussion Directive 91/477 and the amendments of
the contested Directive, the CJEU assessed that by “adjusting the
Czech
Firearm
Case,
BREXIT
INSTITUTE,
(Jan.
14,
2020),
http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2020/01/conferred-powers-proportionality-and-nondiscrimination-in-the-czech-firearm-case/ [https://perma.cc/UR6V-RXKU].
154. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, paras. 21 - 24.
155. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2 , paras. 31 - 33.
156. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, paras. 34 - 40.
157. Case C-58/08, The Queen, on the Application of Vodafone Ltd. and Others v.
Sec'y of State for Bus., Enterprise and Reg. Reform, 2010 E.C.R. I-04999.
158. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, paras. 41 - 45.
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balance between the free movement of goods and security
guarantees, [t]he European Union legislature merely adopted the
rule on the possession and acquisition of firearms set out in
Directive 91/477 to changes in circumstances. [emphasis
added]”.159 This change to circumstances is a core competence of
the European Union legislature in its task of safeguarding the
general interests recognized by the Treaty (see also the precedent
of Vodafone and Others160).161
By pointing to an earlier decision regarding the Firearms
Directive in Buhagiar and Others,162 the CJEU found that the
predominant purpose of the measures read in conjunction with the
earlier Directive was still “the free movement of goods,
approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions
of the Member States, whilst circumscribing that freedom with
safety guarantees that are suited to the nature of the goods at
issue.”163 The CJEU found that firearms are inherently dangerous
goods, not only for the user itself (as the Czech Republic argued in
the oral hearing)164 but also for fellow citizens, therefore, safety, as
general interest recognized by the Treaty, can form an ancillary
purpose of a Directive under Article 114 TFEU. Thus, the Czech
Republic’s first plea was unfounded.
2. Second Plea: Breach of the Principle of Proportionality
In its second plea, the Czech Republic alleged that the
European legislature did not had sufficient information at its
disposal when it drafted the Directive. Therefore, it was incapable
of assessing the proportionality of the Directive.165 This argument
was based upon the fact that the Commission failed to conduct an
impact assessment before drafting the Directive. In an
interinstitutional agreement with the Parliament under Article
295 TFEU, the Commission pledged to carry out an impact
assessment. However, when the Commission drafted the Directive,
159. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, para. 53.
160. Case C-58/08, The Queen, on the Application of Vodafone Ltd. and Others v.
Sec'y of State for Bus., Enterprise and Reg. Reform, 2010 E.C.R. I-04999.
161. Case C-482/17, supra note 2, para. 38.
162. Case C-267/16, Albert Buhagiar and Others v. Minister for Just., O.J. C 260.
163. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, para. 59. C-482/17, Czech Republic v European
Parliament and Council of the European Union, para. 59.
164. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, para. 53.
165. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, paras. 65 - 73.
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it lacked time for an impact assessment and instead relied on the
REFIT evaluation,166 which was carried out as a general review
mechanism.
First, the CJEU highlighted a broad discretion which the EU
legislature has in evaluating and assessing legislative measures.167
Further, the CJEU followed the Opinion of the AG that a pledge to
carry out an impact assessment in an interinstitutional agreement
under Article 295 TFEU is a non-binding commitment.168 This is an
interesting finding by the Court which may have seminal
consequences for future lawmaking. The CJEU reasoned that the
lack of an impact assessment could not automatically lead to an
infringement of the principle of proportionality. Instead, the
availability of existing information could be sufficient to have a
meaningful assessment of the principle of proportionality.169 After
assessing the different studies (among them the REFIT evaluation),
which the EU legislature took into account, the CJEU found that the
richness of those studies was sufficient for the legislature to make
a meaningful assessment of the proportionality of the new
measures.170
In the second part of its second plea, the Czech Republic
contested singular articles of the new Directive. Allegedly, these
articles failed the proportionality test of the European Union. The
Czech Republic claimed that they could have been achieved by less
restrictive means.171 Specifically, the complete prohibition of semiautomatic firearms, as well as the stricter requirements for
deactivated and antique firearms, were criticized.172 Technical
details of the measures which the Czech Republic contested can be
found in the judgement.173
First, the CJEU clarified, that the judicial review of the
proportionality of legislative acts is limited. The CJEU is not in the
position to substitute the EU legislature assessment by its own.174
Instead, the Court can only assess whether the legislature
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Technopolis et al., supra note 79.
Case C-482/17, supra note 2, paras. 76-81.
Id. para. 82.
Id. para. 85.
Id. paras. 87 - 92.
Id. paras. 95 - 101.
Id. paras. 120, 127.
Id. paras. 102 - 104.
Id. para. 118.
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‘manifestly exceeded’ its broad discretion.175Assessing the
technical details of the new prohibitions of certain types of semiautomatic firearms, the CJEU concluded that ‘those institutions
[the Council and the Parliament] do not appear to have exceeded
their broad discretion’ by these prohibitions.176 The CJEU found the
same regarding the proportionality of the new measures
concerning deactivated and antique firearms.177 The benchmark of
‘manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objectives’ is a high bar
to reach for new legislation to be deemed unproportioned.
Therefore, under the CJEU’s limited power and capacity of review,
the Court declared the new measures to pass the proportionality
test.
Lastly, the Czech Republic alleged that the contested Directive
interfered with the right to property as enshrined in Article 17 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter “the Charter”).178
The CJEU found that Article 17 of the Charter is not an absolute
right and may be restricted by limitations which accord to the
general interests recognized by the EU or the need to protect the
rights and freedoms of others179 (in regard to the ‘right to property’
see also a comment on SEGRO,180 in which the CJEU extensively
discussed Article 17 of the Charter). The CJEU found the evidence
brought forward by the Czech Republic insufficient to prove a
disproportionate interference with the right to property.
Moreover, the CJEU concluded that a ban on semi-automatic
firearms for safety reasons is in the general interest, which is also
recognized in the last sentence of Article 17 (1) of the Charter. In
consequence, the Czech Republic’s second plea failed.
3. Third Plea: Breach of the Principle of Legal Certainty and of
the Protection of Legitimate Expectations
In its third plea, the Czech Republic alleged that specific
measures of the new Directive impinged on the principle of legal

175. Id. para. 119.
176. Id. para. 126.
177. Id. para. 131.
178. Id. para. 132.
179. Id. para. 134.
180. See generally Xavier Groussot et al., SEGRO and its Aftermath: Between Economic
Freedoms, Property Rights and the ‘Essence of the Rule of Law, 2 NORDIC J. EUR. L. 69 (2019).
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certainty and legitimate legal expectations.181 Specifically, the time
requirements of the new Directive would lead to a retroactive
application. Further, the process of entering into force of the
Directive lead to unattainable expectations on the part of
individuals.
Regarding the plea of lacking legal certainty, the CJEU
rebutted the argument by the Czech Republic. The Court
highlighted that the classification of firearms in the new Directive
is clear and precise, and does, therefore, not lead to a retroactive
application.182 Regarding the plea of unattainable legitimate
expectations of individuals, the CJEU highlighted that the EU
legislature fulfilled its requirement by publishing the contested
Directive in the Official Journal of the EU in a timely manner. This
allowed individuals to know at which point the new rules will come
into force, and until when they could buy which kinds of
firearms.183
4. Fourth Plea: Breach of the Principle of Non-Discrimination
In its fourth plea, the Czech Republic alleged that the Swiss
exception clause (Article 6(6) of the contested Directive), which
allows Swiss militia soldiers to keep their semi-automatic firearms
after completing their service with the Swiss army, constitutes
discrimination against other individuals.184 Why was the Directive
pertinent for Switzerland while it is not part of the European
Union? This was due to the fact that the Directive is pertinent to all
Member States of the Schengen area, among them Switzerland. The
CJEU first recalled the principle of non-discrimination in European
Union law as requiring that “comparable situations must not be
treated differently and that different situations must not be treated
in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified.”185
The CJEU found that the Swiss Confederation and the other
Member States are not comparable regarding the subject matter of
that derogation. The Swiss Confederation “[h]as the proven
experience and ability to trace and monitor persons and weapons
concerned, which gives reason to assume that the public security
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, paras. 140 - 143.
Id. paras. 149 - 151.
Id. paras. 153 - 156.
Id. paras. 159 - 161.
Id. para. 164.
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and safety objectives” will be achieved.186 Moreover, the Czech
Republic failed to bring evidence forward that there are other
states within the Schengen area which that have the same system
of mandatory subscription and transfer of military firearms in
place as the Swiss Confederation. Hence, the CJEU also rejected the
last plea of the Czech Republic.187
C.

Comment on the Judgement of the CJEU in Czech Republic v
Parliament and Council

Czech Republic v Parliament and Council is a detailed and
comprehensive judgment which touches upon many principles of
European Union law. It ends the legal challenge between the Czech
Republic and the European Union. The tactic of exhausting legal
remedies after being outvoted in the Council has a long tradition in
the European Union legal order (see, for example, Spain v
Parliament and Council188). This was also in the Czech Firearms the
recurring storyline. The Czech Republic took legal actions after it
had been outvoted in the Council, and its MEPs had not been heard
in the Parliament. The judicial route is a preferred route for
Member State’s governments thereafter. However, the question of
firearms regulation is highly political. Therefore, a legal discussion
on the substance might not be the right tool to address the issue.
The contested Directive places more emphasis on security
requirements for legal firearms holders in the European Union.
Further, the contested Directive prohibits the possession of semiautomatic firearms within the European single market by civilians.
The pleas of the Czech Republic focused on the outer limits of
Article 114 TFEU. Is this Article suitable for tightening of firearms
possession, or does it fall into the area of judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and must, therefore, be adopted under Article 84
TFEU? This was the question the Court essentially had to answer.
From the tobacco advertising case-law of the CJEU, it is known that
Article 114 TFEU can be interpreted broadly. In this case, the CJEU
followed its earlier line of reasoning by allowing security as an

186. Id. para. 166.
187. Id. paras. 167 - 168.
188. Case C-146/13, Kingdom of Spain v. Eur. Parl. & Council of the Eur. Union, 2015
E.C.R. I-3.
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objective of a Directive, which was adopted in the single market
under the competence of Article 114 TFEU.
By this judgement, the CJEU affirmed the federal legislative
competence of the European Union to lower the ceiling of firearm
possession in the European Union. Firearms are goods that are sold
and purchased on the internal market; therefore, the EU is the
adequate body to regulate, and the internal market competence is
sufficient to harmonize the possession of firearms in the EU. As a
result, Member States have to converge and adjust in their firearm
regulations (if they not already did). Some Member States already
have a higher bar of firearms possessions as the one purported by
the Directive, other as the Czech Republic now have to change their
national laws accordingly. The political consequence of this
judgement is that also in highly political fields, such as firearms
regulation, Member States have to abide by the qualified consensus
in the Council. In conclusion, the CJEU upheld the federal
competence in opposition to national defiance. In the following
Part IV of the article, the present case (Czech Republic v Parliament
and Council) will be compared to SCOTUS’s United States v Lopez
decision.
IV. COMPARISON TO UNITED STATES V LOPEZ – CHALLENGE OF
THE GUNFREE SCHOOL ZONE ACT AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers
enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those
enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially
enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the
Commerce Clause always will engender "legal uncertainty.”189
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in his majority opinion in
United States v Lopez. Stressing that federal powers under the
Commerce Clause have an outer limit.

In Part IV of the article, the proceedings in front of the CJEU in
Czech Republic v Parliament and Council (C-482/17) will be
189. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
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compared to the Lopez case law of SCOTUS. From a comparative
viewpoint, the case SCOTUS Lopez190 can give some guidance on
the federal competence to regulate firearms in a similar federal
legal system. In this landmark judgment, the US Supreme Court
found that a ban on firearms in schools cannot be regulated on a
federal level by using Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the US
Constitution, known as the Commerce Clause. Compared to the
United States, the CJEU was more willing to give leeway to Article
114 TFEU (the comparable Article in the EU legal system to the
Commerce Clause) to regulate the use of firearms in the Member
States.
Lopez is a highly interesting SCOTUS decision in many
regards. First, it concerns a case of firearms legislation in which the
federal law was invoked to prosecute firearms possession. Second,
the case discusses the intensity of judicial scrutiny by the Supreme
Court when Congress enacts laws. Finally, it marks a limitation of
the federal powers of lawmaking under the Commerce Clause at a
time at which most law scholars in the United States thought that
there are literally no restrictions on the legislative mandate of the
Congress under the Commerce Clause.191 It is a case about
federalism, its powers, limits, and its influence on firearms
legislation. Therefore, it is highly logical to compare this case to
Czech Republic v Parliament and Council since both cases
fundamentally question the power of federal lawmaking in the
area of firearms legislation.
A.

The Background of United States v Lopez

The case concerned Alfonso Lopez, which brought a gun to his
school on March 12, 1992, to sell it to another pupil in view of the
gun being used in a gang fight.192 After his conduct was exposed, he
was charged violating the GunFree School Zone Act of 1990. A
federal criminal law enacted under the Commerce Clause. Lopez
challenged the constitutionality of this act in the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, the Texas district court. In an astonishing
judgment the court found that section 922 of the act “[i]n the full
190. Id.
191. Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 675 (1995).
192. Molly E. Homan, Comment, United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court Guns Down
the Commerce Clause, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 237, 237(1995).
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reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause.”193 The Court of Appeals found, “[t]hat
Congress failed to show, through legislative findings or legislative
history, how gun possession in a school zone affects interstate
commerce.”194 The US government filed a petition to SCOTUS for a
review of the district court’s decision. In sweeping judgment,
SCOTUS held that the Commerce Clause is limited, and the
aggregated effect of carrying handguns in a school environment
was not sufficiently linked to interstate commerce. This decision
was groundbreaking in the way that it was the first case since 1937
and the New Deal legislation in which the Supreme Court held that
Congress had exceeded its power to legislate under the Commerce
Clause.
B.

Why is United States v Lopez Pertinent to Czech Republic v
Parliament and Council?

Why is it appropriate to compare this case with the decision
of the CJEU in Czech Republic v Parliament and Council? Article 114
TFEU is a suitable comparator to the US Commerce Clause. The
similarities between both articles have been acknowledged by
numerous authors on both sides of the Atlantic, “[t]he Commerce
Clause resembles Article 114 TFEU, the provision granting the
legislator of the European Union power to adopt harmonizing acts
in relation to the internal market.”195 Therefore, it is reasonable to
compare both cases. In both cases, a federal law on firearms
possession (Directive 2017/853; the GunFree School Zone Act)
was enacted by the federal lawmaker (Parliament and Council;
Congress). In both, cases the federal lawmaker used its internal
market competence to enact the law (Article 114 TFEU; the
Commerce Clause), and this competence was subsequently
challenged in front of the apex courts of the respective legal system
(CJEU; SCOTUS). Moreover, in both cases, the respective apex
courts then had to decide if the federal legislative body
overstepped its competence by enacting firearms regulation under
the cloak of inter-state commerce.
193. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
194. Homan, supra note 192, at 264.
195. Lena Boucon, E.U. Free Movement Law and the Powers Retained by Member
States (Dec. 12, 2014) (Eur. U. Inst.) at 21.

2020]

FIREARMS REGULATION IN THE EU

891

Of course, the differences between both cases should not be
overlooked. While in Lopez, an individual applicant challenges the
constitutionality of a federal criminal act, in Czech Republic v
Parliament and Council, a Member State challenges the
constitutionality of a federal Directive of firearms possession.
However, these differences are in view of the Author not too
differential to spare the beneficial use of a thorough comparison of
both cases.
C.

Comparing Both Judgements

1. The Respective Standard of Review
According to the case-law of the Supreme Court concerning
the judicial review of legislative acts under the Commerce Clause
before Lopez, the Supreme Court would exercise a rational basis
review. This is a limited review under which the SCOTUS would not
go into depth when analyzing congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause. “Traditionally, under ‘rational basis’ review, if
the court perceives any plausible reason for congressional action,
the inquiry ends.”196 It is not upon SCOTUS’s competence to
imagine a better way how the legislature could have enacted a
specific act. “The judiciary’s ability to imagine a better, more
perfect solution does not render a law irrational.”197 The CJEU’s
judicial review on acts adopted under Article 114 TFEU seems
similar but distinct. It is also not under the CJEU’s power to read
something into the law and to imagine a better way how the
legislature could have enacted a specific Regulation or Directive.
“[t]he criterion to be applied is not whether a measure adopted in
such an area was the only or the best possible measure, since its
legality can be affected only if the measure is manifestly
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent
institution is seeking to pursue.”198 Neither it is upon the CJEU to
carry out its own impact assessment. “[a]s regards the subject
matter of the judicial review to be carried out by the Court, it is
important to note that […] it is not for the Court to substitute its
own assessment for that of the EU legislature.”199 The standard of
196.
197.
198.
199.

Homan, supra note 192, at 277.
Id. at 278.
Case C – 482/17, supra note 2.
Id. para. 118.
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review at the CJEU is instead whether the legislature manifestly
exceeded its broad discretion in view of the objectives pursued
with the legislative act. “[i]t is for the Court to determine whether
the EU legislature manifestly exceeded its broad discretion with
regard to the complex assessments and evaluations it was called
upon to conduct in the present case, by opting for measures that
were manifestly inappropriate with regard to the objective
pursued.”200
The difference in the standard of review by both courts comes
to light when it comes to the findings of the lawmaker. Historically,
findings played no significant part in SCOTUS’s standard of review
under the Commerce Clause. However, Lopez seemed to have
changed that. “Since findings bear no significance under typical
rational basis review, and since the Lopez Court suggested that
Congress include findings, it seems the Court raised the standard
of review to something more than rational basis.”201 Homan even
argues that thus SCOTUS significantly raised its standard of review.
CJEU acknowledged in earlier case-law that the findings of the
lawmaker play a part when assessing the discretion of the
lawmaker in a specific case. “[T]he EU legislature’s broad
discretion, which implies limited judicial review of its exercise,
applies not only to the nature and scope of the measures to be
taken but also, to some extent, to the finding of the basic facts.”202
Therefore, the CJEU took into account the findings which were
provided by the legislative branch to the CJEU. “It follows that the
institutions must at the very least be able to produce and set out
clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into
account as the basis of the contested measures of the act and on
which the exercise of their discretion depended.”203 It, therefore,
might not be a full fact and findings analysis, which the CJEU carries
out as its standard of review. However, the CJEU scrutinizes the
findings if they complement the argumentation of the legislature.
Similarly, an emphasis on the legislative duty to provide findings
can be inferred from Lopez. “Now, under the reasoning of Lopez,
the Court will look not to what Congress might have thought, but

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. para. 119.
Homan, supra note 192, at 278.
Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, para. 78.
Id. para. 81.
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demand findings expressing what Congress did reason.”204
Therefore, SCOTUS’s standard of review under the Commerce
Clause shifted with Lopez towards a standard of review, which is
exercised by the CJEU.
2. Lack of Expressed Findings in Lopez or the Lacking Impact
Assessment in Czech Republic v Parliament and Council
In Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, the Czech Republic
argued that the EU lawmaker had not adhered to its own
standards. Namely, to conduct an impact assessment to evaluate
potential needs and the necessity of a new Directive in the field of
firearms legislation. Analogically, SCOTUS lamented the lack of
expressed congressional findings in Lopez. “The Court did not
mandate these findings, and the validity of the GunFree School
Zone Act did not turn on the presence or absence of findings, but
the Lopez Court certainly educated Congress on what role findings
play.”205 In both cases, the courts affirmed that the federal
lawmaker is not necessarily obliged to include findings into the
legislation of what impact that legislation would have on interstate
commerce. But, it was in Lopez a potentially decisive factor that
Congress did not provide adequate findings in regard to the impact
of the act on interstate commerce.206 As Deborah Jones Merritt
notes, “[a]ltough the Supreme Court refused to require
congressional findings or a legislative history as a prerequisite to
sustaining a statute under the Commerce Clause, the lack of
congressional attention undoubtedly contributed to the Court’s
decision.”207
In Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, the CJEU found
that an interinstitutional agreement that pledges an impact
assessment is not binding for the federal lawmaker and that,
therefore, this cannot be the sole ground to strike down a Directive.
In fact, the CJEU was content with the REFIT report, which the
Commission produced as an adequate finding in regard to the
impact of the Directive on the single market. Also, the Directive,
unlike the GunFree School Zone Act, mentions the findings from
previous studies on the impact of gun possession. While “[t]he
204.
205.
206.
207.

Homan, supra note 192, at 278.
Id. at 277.
Jones Merritt, supra note 191, at 697.
Id. at 698.
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GunFree School Zone Act of 1990 contained no findings, and the
Court refused to import findings from previous similar but distinct
acts.”208 In Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, the CJEU relied
on findings regarding the earlier Directives and included the
legislative history in its assessment. This is a decisive difference
between both legislations in regard to the judicial review exercised
by the relevant supreme court.
3. The Right to Property in the Respective Legal Orders
In both cases, the right to property played a crucial role. While
the European Union respects the right to property in Article 17 of
the Charter, the US places the right to property in the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution (hereinafter “the
Constitution”). The Czech Republic invoked the right to property
as a defense for firearms possession in the Czech Republic. In
arguing, that the Directive may have a direct impact on firearm
holders in the way that they are deprived of their property with the
enactment of the Directive. Notably, the same argument was made
in the United States. “Rhetoric in some lower court opinion
explicitly opposed the GunFree School Zones Act as contrary to the
right of private homeowners.”209 Despite that the right to property
was the decisive argument for SCOTUS judgment, it was definitely
a factor in making the decision for Lopez. The CJEU, in contrary,
noted that “[i]t follows that it has not been established, from the
elements in the file before the Court, that the limitations placed by
the contested directive on the exercise of the right to property
recognised by the Charter, in particular with regard to the semiautomatic firearms […], constitute a disproportionate interference
with that right.”210 Thus, there was not disproportionate
circumvention of the right to property as recognized by the Charter
with the provisions of the new Directive. It is sufficient to say that
the right to property has indeed a much higher standing in terms
of recognition as a fundamental right in the United States than in
the European Union. This was reflected in the respective role the
right to property played in Lopez and in Czech Republic v
Parliament and Council.
208. Homan, supra note 192, at 277.
209. Jones Merritt, supra note 191, at 701.
210. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2, para. 138.
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4. The Argument of National Urgency
The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez was
also influenced by the lack of national necessity and urgency of the
issue under scrutiny. Texas had a national law prohibiting firearms
on school grounds, which was working well. Therefore the federal
criminalization of firearms possession seemed superfluous.
“Congress made no findings, and the Government made no
argument in Lopez, that state and local officials were unable to
enforce these laws.”211 This situation was radically different in
Czech Republic v Parliament and Council.212 Notably, two terror
attacks in Paris and Copenhagen led to the swift adoption of the
Directive.213 During these terror attacks, semi-automatic firearms
were used214, the legislative response was the prohibition of
civilian semi-automatic firearm possession in the European Union.
National laws of the Member States seemed insufficient in regard
to the regulation of semi-automatic firearms. The CJEU, therefore,
potentially took into account the need for this new law, which was
enacted during turbulent times in Europe. While a national
emergency cannot be the absolute vindication for any law under
any competence, it probably has influenced the CJEU in its decision
making. Indeed, the French advocate emphasized in the court
hearing the vindication of this legislation in light of the terror
attacks which happened in Europe.215 Eventually, this emotional
argument beyond a black letter law analysis was well-received by
the judges. Contrary, the US Government failed to find a reason for
a national emergency in the case of the GunFree School Zone Act.
“The Government’s failure to identify an urgent need to combat
that problem, however, contributed to the majority’s rejection of
congressional power.”216

211. Jones Merritt, supra note 191, at 703-04.
212. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2.
213. Hans von der Burchard & Ryan Heath, EU takes aim at weapons tied to terror
attacks, POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-takes-aim-atweapons-tied-to-terror-attacks-commission-schengen/ [https://perma.cc/HG8R-QEKT].
214. Andersen, supra note 88.
215. Case C – 482/17, supra note 2.
216. Jones Merritt, supra note 191, at 703-04.
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5. The Federalization of Criminal Law
The GunFree School Zone Act was a federal criminal law
enacted by Congress.217 Whereas the Firearms Directive is not a
criminal law. Instead, it is an act regulating the trade and
possession of firearms in the European Union. The EU legislature
cannot prescribe criminal penalties since this is a competence
reserved for the Member States.218 Ultimately, the European Union
can only require Member States to enact effective, proportionate,
and dissuasive penalties for individuals that infringe upon a
Directive or Regulation.219 The law enforcement, as well as the
precise penalties, are however, in the hands of the Member State’s
police and judiciary. There is no powerful federal police force, such
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the European
Union.220 Only Europol could be compared in this regard. However,
the competence and power of Europol are much more limited. The
agency has no executive power, and its officials are not entitled to
arrest suspects in the Member States.221 Therefore, while the factor
of federalization of criminal law influenced the decision in Lopez, it
played no part in the decision-finding in Czech Republic v
Parliament and Council. At the Supreme Court, the fact that the
federal act was domiciled in the area of criminal law might have
influenced the judges towards a negative decision. “The Lopez
majority stressed that criminal law, like education, is a matter
traditionally left to the states.” By the act, there was further
duplication of state and federal crimes in that area, since Texas
already had in place an act which prohibited firearms around
schools. The question left in Lopez is, why the federal prosecutor
took the case when there was effective law enforcement on the
state level.

217. Gun-Free School Zones Act § 921(a)(25) Crime Control Act of 1990 (1990).
218. VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, ET AL., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU CRIMINAL LAW (2016).
219. Id.
220. See generally Monica Den Boer & Willy Bruggeman, Shifting Gear : Europol in the
Contemporary
Policing
Era,
3
POLITIQUE
EUROPÉENNE
(2007),
https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2007-3-page-77.htm#
[https://perma.cc/Z7D7-NKJE].
221. Id.
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6. The Need to Set a Limit to the Federal Legislative Competence
The Commerce Clause, as Article 114 TFEU, gives the federal
lawmaker broad powers to legislate in the area of interstates
commerce and the internal market. Potentially, there was a
willingness at the Supreme Court to set a limit to these broad
powers. “Before Lopez, many academics and lower court judges
speculated that the Commerce Clause no longer imposed any limits
on congressional action.”222 The federal branch had legislated
under the Commerce Clause without any restraint since 1937,223
therefore, SCOTUS may have thought that approving the very
feeble and weak arguments and justification by the Government
would have eventually led to the perception that there are factually
no restraints for Congress under the Commerce Clause. “The Lopez
majority expressed grave concern that sustaining the GunFree
School Zones Act under the Government’s rationales would render
Congress’s commerce power completely unbounded.”224
Oppositely, in Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, there was
no need for the CJEU to make a point that there are limits under
Article 114 TFEU. In fact, the EU had might had its Lopez moment
already earlier. Respectively, in the case Federal Republic of
Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union,
the CJEU stroke down the tobacco advertising Directive for its
wrong legal basis.225 In Germany v Parliament and Council226 the
CJEU found that harmonization under Article 114 TFEU is not
without limits, as regards a ban on advertising of tobacco products.
In this case, the CJEU “[s]aid the directive should not have been
adopted as an EU internal market directive aimed at removing
market distortions. Germany and the producers argued it was a
public health measure.”227 In this case, the CJEU found that the EU
legislature cannot rely on Article 114 TFEU “[s]imply because
222. Jones Merritt, supra note 191, at 703-04.
223. The last time SCOTUS limited congressional power under the Commerce Clause
was during the New Deal Era, when the SCOTUS resisted against FDR’s political agenda.
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 314 (1998).
224. Jones Merritt, supra note 191, at 712.
225. Case C-376/98, Fed. Republic of Ger. v. Eur. Parl. & Council of the Eur. Union,
2000 E.C.R. I-8534.
226. Id. at I-8533.
227. European Court Overturns Ban on Tobacco Advertising, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2000),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2000/oct/05/advertising
[https://perma.cc/K88Q-MXU7].

898

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

actual or potential divergences in national rules are found. It is only
insofar as such disparities restrict interstate-trade in goods and/or
services or imply an appreciable distortion of competition, and if
harmonisation actually improves the establishment and
functioning of the internal market, […].”228 While this case was
between commerce and public health, it certainly is comparable to
Lopez in the way the Court set a limit to the federal competences.
In the United States, that had not been done since the New Deal
legislation, and therefore, there was an apparent need for the
SCOTUS to demonstrate the limits to the Commerce Clause. In the
European Union, the Commission had already acknowledged the
limits of Article 114 TFEU and, therefore, drafted any legislation
very more thoroughly under Article 114 TFEU.
V. CONCLUSION
The final Part IV of this article has aimed to display an
enriching comparison between the regulation of firearms in the EU
and in the United States and its respective legal challenges at the
relevant apex court. Demonstrating the comparisons and
differences of Czech Republic v Parliament and Council and Lopez.
While in Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, the CJEU held up
the Firearms Directive under the single market competence. In
Lopez, SCOTUS declared that the federal lawmaker had
overstepped its competences by enacting the GunFree School Zone
Act under the Commerce Clause. The comparison, however,
underlines that in both systems, the federal lawmaker has a very
wide discretion to enact firearms legislation under the single
market competence. In the European Union, this competence
derives from Article 114 TFEU, and in the United States from the
Commerce Clause. As Cuyvers notes, “[a]fter all, as we know from
the Commerce Clause in the US Constitution, almost anything can
be said to affect the internal market, as almost all rules will have
some (indirect) effect on cross-border-trade.”229 The legislative
and judicial future will demonstrate if both supreme courts will
foster federalization by upholding the federal competence under
228. Christophe Hillion, Tobacco Advertising: If You Must, You May, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
486, 488 (2001).
229. Armin Cuyvers, The Legal Framework of the EU, in EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY LAW
121 (Emmanuel Ugirashebuja et al. eds., 2017).
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the Commerce Clause/Article 114 TFEU, or if there will be a step
back by placing more limits on this federal competence. Taking a
step back, it can be said that the regime of firearms in the European
Union and the United States may be substantially different.
Specifically, in regard to the constitutional right to bear arms
which exists in the United States but not in the European Union.
However, the federal regulation of firearms may be very similar in
regard to the federal competence to regulate and its judicial
ramifications at the respective highest courts of both federal legal
systems.
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